Defending Active Directory
Make the attacks against your domain difficult, detectable and containable
Most domain compromises use Active Directory as it was designed: a service account nobody rotated, a permission nobody reviewed, a delegation setting left over from a migration. This course follows each of those attacks to the evidence it leaves, the detection that catches it, the control that stops it and the check that proves the control works, then teaches you to respond to a compromised domain and recover the forest.
What you'll be able to do
Course Syllabus
Every module and every lesson. The first three modules are open; the rest open on a click.
Download the full syllabus (PDF)
Orientation
Module 0 of Defending Active Directory: what Active Directory is and why attackers want it, Northgate's domain, the evidence this course reads, your first investigation, four ways to write a detection, and what this course builds.
Foundations
Module 1 of Defending Active Directory: sign-ins to domain controllers, stealing NTDS.dit, passwords in SYSVOL, replication and DCSync, the forgotten domain controller, and reading authentication on a DC.
Module 2 of Defending Active Directory: advanced audit policy for domain controllers, SACLs and directory service changes, collection gaps, and reading an event.
Module 3 of Defending Active Directory: reading an AD intrusion as a sequence, control is privilege, and mapping your detections to ATT&CK.
Module 4 of Defending Active Directory: native-command reconnaissance, LDAP reconnaissance, SharpHound collection, and detecting and scoring enumeration.
Privileged Access
Module 5 of Defending Active Directory: hidden and forgotten privileged accounts and Tool 2, tier 0 credentials on lower-tier machines, administration from daily-use devices instead of privileged access workstations, helpdesk reset rights over privileged accounts, and break-glass accounts.
Module 6 of Defending Active Directory: credential theft from LSASS with Credential Guard and LSA protection, credentials exposed by Remote Desktop with Restricted Admin and Remote Credential Guard, Protected Users and authentication policies, and administrator passwords stored in services and scheduled tasks.
Module 7 of Defending Active Directory: lateral movement with one local administrator password shared across the laptops and Windows LAPS, who can read the passwords LAPS manages and the record a read leaves, and domain groups placed in every machine's Administrators group.
Credential Theft
Module 8 of Defending Active Directory: pass-the-hash with a stolen NTLM credential, NTLM relay and the coercion that makes a controller authenticate, relay to LDAP with LDAP signing and channel binding, and auditing NTLM before restricting it.
Module 9 of Defending Active Directory: Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, pass-the-ticket and overpass-the-hash, golden tickets and krbtgt, and silver tickets.
Module 10 of Defending Active Directory: an over-privileged service account that reaches the domain, service accounts signing in interactively, moving to gMSA and dMSA, and the service account assessment.
Attack Paths
Module 11 of Defending Active Directory: GenericWrite and GenericAll on a user, WriteDACL and WriteOwner, AddMember on a privileged group, ForceChangePassword, and finding dangerous permissions.
Module 12 of Defending Active Directory: a malicious GPO edit, a malicious GPO link, and reviewing delegated GPO rights.
Module 13 of Defending Active Directory: unconstrained delegation and coercion, constrained delegation and protocol transition, resource-based constrained delegation, and auditing delegation across the domain.
Module 14 of Defending Active Directory: collecting safely and reading the graph, the shortest realistic path to Domain Admin, breaking paths by choosing the cheapest edge, and the Attack Path Workbook.
Infrastructure
Module 15 of Defending Active Directory: stealing the domain from backups and virtual machine snapshots, malicious services on a domain controller, exploiting an unpatched controller, and outbound traffic from controllers.
Module 16 of Defending Active Directory: LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoning, WPAD abuse, and malicious records through dynamic updates.
Module 17 of Defending Active Directory: moving across a forest trust without selective authentication, SID history across trusts and SID filtering, escalation from a child domain to its forest root, and abusing the inter-realm trust key.
Module 18 of Defending Active Directory: ESC1 and a requester who names the subject, ESC2 and ESC3 with any-purpose and enrollment agent certificates, ESC4 and editable templates, ESC6 and ESC7 on the CA's own settings and officers, and ESC8 relaying to web enrollment.
Detection Engineering
Module 19 of Defending Active Directory: from single detections to a catalog and a deployable pack, correlating alerts into incidents, testing detections with labeled attacks, and tuning against the legitimate activity that looks like an attack in Active Directory.
Module 20 of Defending Active Directory: what the sensors see and miss, investigating a reconnaissance alert, investigating a credential-access alert, and the posture assessments as a work queue.
Response
Module 21 of Defending Active Directory: classifying an intrusion's impact, scoping every account, host and controller it touched, credential containment and reset order, resetting krbtgt, and the AD incident response playbook.
Module 22 of Defending Active Directory: AdminSDHolder backdoors, SID history injection, DCShadow and rogue domain controllers, Skeleton Key and malicious authentication packages, golden certificates and stolen CA keys, and hunting a domain for persistence.
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Recovery
Module 23 of Defending Active Directory: backups an attacker cannot destroy or poison, restoring a deleted or altered privileged object, recovering the first domain controller in isolation, and the forest recovery runbook.
Module 24 of Defending Active Directory: baselines and standards with Tool 1, the AD security assessment, the operating cadence that runs every recurring check, and measuring AD security over time.
Resources
One sheet per module of Defending Active Directory, each entry a question, the KQL and SPL query a lesson ran to answer it on the course month, what to read in the result and what the result does not prove.
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- 1Sources and the Course Month
- 2How Active Directory Really Works
- 3AD Security Logging
- 4The AD Attack Lifecycle
- 5Active Directory Enumeration
- 6Privileged Identity Architecture
- 7Protecting Administrator Credentials
- 8Local Administrator Security and Windows LAPS
- 9NTLM Security
- 10Kerberos Attacks
- 11Service Account Security
- 12ACL Abuse
- 13Group Policy Attacks
- 14Delegation Abuse
- 15BloodHound for Defenders
- 16Domain Controller Hardening
- 17Securing AD DNS
- 18Trust Security
- 19Certificate Services Attacks
- 20Detection Engineering for AD
- 21Microsoft Defender for Identity
- 22Responding to AD Compromise
- 23Persistence Hunting
- 24Backup and Forest Recovery
- 25Building an AD Security Program
Procedures for the questions an AD investigation raises, each run on the course month.
What the course runs on, and an optional lab domain of your own for the Defend and Verify steps: the AD corpus and evidence folders, building a corp.ne.com controller, and the script that seeds it with Northgate's weaknesses.
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Six worked investigations on the course's Active Directory corpus, each from an alert or a detection row to a verdict: the Kerberoasting alert, svc-legacy's AS-REP, the LSASS read, the database copied over C$, the DCSync alert and the nightly backup.
Hunting patterns for AD persistence and detection tuning, and the AD security calendar.
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Where to practice what the course teaches: queries on the AD corpus in the page, graded exercises and challenge sets, configuration audits, and the tools the course builds.
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Every detection in Defending Active Directory, by phase of the course, in KQL, SPL, PowerShell and Sigma, generated from the course detection library.
The sources behind Defending Active Directory, arranged by the question each answers: the events, how AD works, the attacks, BloodHound, Defender for Identity, writing detections, hardening and public guidance.
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- 1Which event records it, and what do its fields mean
- 2How does Active Directory work underneath
- 3How does the attack work, and how is it classified
- 4What does BloodHound show, and how is it collected
- 5What does Microsoft Defender for Identity see
- 6How do I write and test the detection
- 7Which command, cmdlet or API does the job
- 8How do I configure, harden or administer it
- 9What do government and standards bodies advise
- 10Where can I read further
Project
The Defending Active Directory project: a prepared case from another company's domain, worked with the course's own tools from the evidence pack alone, ending in a timeline, the attack path, a scope register, the detections that fired and those that did not, a containment and reset order, the persistence found, and a page for leadership. No submission, no grading.
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Course Completion
Defending Active Directory end-of-course exam: twenty-four tasks, one per teaching module, each answered by writing KQL against the course's AD corpus month and checked on the server.
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Course overview
Active Directory decides who can sign in to almost everything an organization runs, which is why an attacker who controls it controls the business. This course teaches every part of AD through what an attacker can do with it: how Kerberos and NTLM authenticate, where privileged credentials end up, what a permission or a delegation setting lets an account do, and how certificate services, DNS and trusts extend the attack surface.
It is taught on Northgate Engineering's domain. A month of its domain controller telemetry sits in the page, queryable in KQL and SPL, and every module adds evidence files of the directory's own state. The course ends where most security courses stop: deciding whether a domain has been compromised, containing it, hunting what the attacker left behind, recovering the forest and running AD security as a program afterwards.
How this course works
Every attack, end to end. Each attack lesson shows how the attack works, the evidence it leaves, the detection that catches it, the control that stops it, and the check that proves the control is in place.
Four detection surfaces. Every detection is written for Sentinel KQL, Splunk SPL, PowerShell with Get-WinEvent and Sigma, so it works with whatever your organization runs, including no SIEM at all.
Every result is real. Every query in the course runs against the corpus in the page and every number in a lesson came from running it. Graded exercises and a challenge set in each module check your answers the same way.
What you will learn
Who this course is for
SOC analysts, detection engineers, incident responders and infrastructure administrators who work with Windows domains, and people moving into those roles. No prior AD security knowledge is assumed; every concept is explained where it is first used, and the free Module 0 includes a Course Fit Check that shows where you sit.
What you will build
What this course does not cover
Active Directory administration for its own sake, offensive tradecraft beyond what a defender needs to recognize an attack, SIEM engineering, and cloud identity beyond Entra Connect as a tier 0 server. Cloud identity and Windows endpoint forensics each have their own courses on the platform.
Things you need to know
What are the prerequisites?
None. Module 0 is free and explains what Active Directory is, how Northgate's domain is built and how to read the course's evidence before the first attack lesson.
Do I need a SIEM or a lab?
No. Every query runs in the page against the course's corpus, and every tool runs on the evidence files with PowerShell 7. A lab domain of your own is optional; the lab setup pages show how to build one with Northgate's weaknesses seeded so you can practice each fix.
How is the course assessed?
By a practical exam: twenty-four tasks, one per teaching module, each answered by querying the AD corpus or an exam evidence file and checked on the server. A score of 70 or more earns the Defending Active Directory certificate with CPE credit. The Project, separate from the exam, is an investigation of an intrusion no module covers.
Usage rights and disclaimer
Course materials: Licensed for individual professional development. You may use the tools you build in your own environment. You may not redistribute course content or share account credentials.
Attack techniques: Attacks are taught to the depth a defender needs to observe, detect and stop them, against fictional evidence. Running them against systems you do not own or have permission to test is illegal.
Fictional environment: All scenarios use Northgate Engineering and Brackmoor Freight. Any resemblance to real organizations is coincidental.
End of Course Exam
Complete the course, then write the queries: twenty-four tasks answered against the AD corpus month, no time limit. Pass mark: 70. Earn your certificate with CPE credits.
Answers are checked on the server. Certificate issued on pass.