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In this section
0.1 What Entra ID Is and Why Attackers Want It
Introduction
Microsoft Entra ID decides who can sign in to Microsoft 365, Azure and every application that trusts it, and with what rights. That makes it the single most valuable thing an attacker can reach in a Microsoft organization: control of it is control of the mail, the files, the cloud infrastructure and the applications, all at once, without touching a single server.
This lesson sets out what Entra ID is, what lives inside a tenant, how a sign-in becomes access, who controls the tenant, what that control is worth, and the footholds attackers go after to get it. It ends with the first use of the method every lesson in this course runs on: Copilot answers a question about the tenant, and you check the answer before you trust it.
One Identity in Front of Everything
What Entra ID isMicrosoft describes Entra ID as a cloud-based identity and access management service that provides authentication, policy enforcement and protection for users, devices, apps and resources. In practice it is the service a person signs in to whenever they use anything Microsoft runs for their organization.
Opening Outlook, joining a Teams call, deploying a virtual machine in Azure and signing in to a SaaS application configured for single sign-on all begin with Entra ID checking who they are.
The tenant those services trust has one page that says what it is:
Entra Admin Center
Entra ID › Overview
Tab
OverviewFields
Tenant ID, Primary domain, LicenseRead the tenant name, tenant ID, primary domain and license on the Overview tab. Every service named in this section trusts the identities this one tenant issues.
The tenant ID on that page is the value every sign-in record in the course carries, which is how one tenant's evidence is told apart from another's.
Nobody has to buy it separately to have one. Microsoft notes that every Microsoft 365, Azure or Dynamics CRM Online subscription comes with Entra ID already: every such tenant is automatically a Microsoft Entra tenant.
A tenant is the organization's own instance of the service, with its own directory of users and its own settings, reached through an initial domain such as example.onmicrosoft.com and usually a custom domain the organization adds.
One tenant, many things that trust it. A change to who can sign in, or as whom, changes access to everything around it at once.
The picture is what makes Entra ID worth defending in its own right. Microsoft 365, Azure, the SaaS applications set up for single sign-on and the devices joined to the tenant do not each keep their own list of who may sign in. They accept the identities and sign-ins Entra ID issues.
A change inside the tenant, a new administrator, a new application permission, a weaker policy, changes access to everything around it at the same moment.
If you have worked with on-premises Active Directory, the comparison is useful and has limits. Both are directories of users and groups, and both are the place an attacker wants to end up.
Entra ID has no domain controllers to break into and no Kerberos tickets to forge. It is reached over the internet by anyone who can attempt a sign-in, and what it hands out after a sign-in is a token that applications accept, which is where most of this course spends its time.
What Lives in a Tenant
Six kinds of thing to defendUsers and groups are the people and the collections of people. Groups matter as much as users, because access is usually granted to a group, and whoever can change a group's membership can change who has that access. That is why Entra ID has role-assignable groups, a kind of group that can hold a directory role and whose membership is protected: only the most privileged administrator roles and the group's own owners can change it. An ordinary group granted access to something sensitive is protected only by whoever can edit it, and in many tenants that is a long list.
A first inventory of those objects takes one short Graph PowerShell block:
PS C:\> Connect-MgGraph -Scopes 'Directory.Read.All'
PS C:\> [pscustomobject]@{
Users = @(Get-MgUser -All).Count
Groups = @(Get-MgGroup -All).Count
Applications = @(Get-MgApplication -All).Count
ServicePrincipals = @(Get-MgServicePrincipal -All).Count
Devices = @(Get-MgDevice -All).Count }
The counts are the size of the problem, and the service principal count is usually the surprise: it runs far ahead of the applications the organization registered itself, because every multitenant application in use leaves one behind.
Applications come in two parts. An app registration is the definition of an application; an enterprise application, also called a service principal, is that application's presence in a tenant, holding the permissions it has been granted and the credentials it signs in with. An application can sign in as itself, with no person involved, and read whatever its permissions allow.
One definition, a service principal in every tenant that uses it. What an application can reach in your tenant is set by its service principal there, whoever wrote the definition and wherever it lives.
The split matters because the two halves can live in different tenants. A multitenant application is defined once, in its publisher's tenant, and gets a service principal in every tenant that consents to it. The permissions it holds in your tenant are recorded on that service principal, and so is every grant an administrator or user makes to it. Its credentials, though, belong to the registration in the home tenant.
Whoever controls the registration controls how the application signs in everywhere it is trusted. A legacy test application whose registration nobody was watching, holding more access than anyone remembered granting, is how Microsoft's own corporate tenant was entered in 2024.
Devices are the laptops and phones joined to or registered with the tenant. A joined device is trusted to sign its user in to every application on it, and Conditional Access can require that a sign-in come from a device the organization manages.
Roles are directory roles such as Global Administrator, each a set of permissions over the tenant itself. They can be held permanently or, with Privileged Identity Management, held as an eligibility that the holder activates when they need it.
Policies are the rules Entra ID applies at sign-in: Conditional Access, the authentication methods users may register, the consent settings that decide who can grant an application access to data, and many more.
Agent identities are the newest kind. AI agents built on Microsoft's platforms now sign in as identities of their own, and even the agents Microsoft builds into Entra ID run under an agent identity granted the read and write permissions their tasks need. An agent with permissions is an application that makes decisions, and Module 8 treats it as the attack surface it is.
Every one of these is something an attacker can add, change or borrow. Most of the modules in this course follow one of them.
How a Sign-In Becomes Access
Checked once, trusted afterwardsWhen a user signs in, Entra ID checks their password or passkey, any multifactor authentication its policies require, the device and location the sign-in comes from, and the risk its detections attach to it. It makes those checks once.
If they pass, it issues tokens, and from then on the user's applications present those tokens instead of the password: a session cookie in the browser, refresh and access tokens in the applications, and on a joined device a primary refresh token that signs the user in to everything on it.
Each of those checks is written down on the sign-in record, and the admin center shows them per sign-in:
Entra Admin Center
Entra ID › Monitoring & health › Sign-in logs › User sign-ins (interactive)
Tabs
Basic info, Authentication Details, Conditional AccessOpen any sign-in and read Basic info, Authentication Details and Conditional Access: the factor used, how MFA was met, and every policy evaluated with its result.
Reading those three tabs on one ordinary sign-in is the fastest way to learn what the tenant actually checks, as opposed to what its policies were meant to check.
Every check runs before the tokens are issued. After that, applications trust the tokens, which is why an attacker who holds one has passed every check without meeting any.
Applications never see the password. Exchange, SharePoint and every application set up for single sign-on read a token Entra ID signed, check that it is genuine, that it is meant for them and that it has not expired, and then act as the user named inside it.
The same is true when an application signs in as itself: it presents a secret or a certificate once, receives a token, and is trusted for as long as the token lasts.
This is the most important fact in the course. Whoever holds a valid token is, to the application receiving it, the identity it was issued to. Every check you configure in Entra ID runs at the moment a token is issued, so an attacker who obtains a token has passed all of them without meeting any.
Module 1 takes the tokens apart one by one; for now it is enough to see why the course follows attacks to the token they produce, not to the password they began with.
Who Controls the Tenant
Directory roles, and the bridge into AzureControl of a tenant is held through directory roles. Microsoft's own descriptions make the scale plain. Global Administrator can manage all aspects of Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft services that use Microsoft Entra identities. Privileged Role Administrator can manage role assignments in Microsoft Entra ID and all aspects of Privileged Identity Management, which means it can make anyone, including itself, a Global Administrator.
Application Administrator and Cloud Application Administrator can create and manage all aspects of app registrations and enterprise apps, and Privileged Authentication Administrator can view, set and reset authentication methods for any user, administrators included. Microsoft marks each of these roles as privileged.
A role can be held three ways, and an honest answer to "who controls this tenant" counts all three. An active assignment means the role is in force now.
An eligible assignment, through Privileged Identity Management, means the holder can activate the role whenever they choose, subject to the activation settings such as MFA or approval. And a role can be assigned to a service principal as well as to a person, in which case anyone holding that application's credential holds the role, with no sign-in prompt anywhere in the path.
Who controls the tenant has three answers, not one, and any of them can reach every Azure subscription with a single setting that the audit log records.
Azure is governed separately, and the separation has a deliberate gap.
Microsoft is explicit that Entra role assignments do not grant access to Azure resources, and Azure role assignments do not grant access to Entra ID. But any Global Administrator can elevate their own access, which assigns them the User Access Administrator role at the root of Azure: they can then view all resources and assign access in any subscription or management group in the tenant.
The setting is per user, it is recorded in the audit log under Azure RBAC (Elevated Access), and Microsoft's guidance is to remove it as soon as the work that needed it is done.
So the question of who controls an organization's cloud has one answer that matters more than any other: who can act as Global Administrator, actively, by eligibility or as an application, and which of them has elevated into Azure.
Entra Admin Center
Entra ID › Roles & admins › Global Administrator › Assignments
Read Active assignments, then Eligible assignments. Count every row on both tabs, including a principal of type Service principal and anyone whose Membership is Group.
Administrators answer the same question in Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and the course shows both every time, because both are how Entra ID is run. Role assignments are filtered on the role's template ID, which for Global Administrator is the same in every tenant, and the principal is expanded so the output names it:
PS C:\> Connect-MgGraph -Scopes 'RoleManagement.Read.Directory', 'Directory.Read.All'
PS C:\> $ga = '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10' # Global Administrator
PS C:\> $f = "roleDefinitionId eq '$ga'"
PS C:\> $q = @{ Filter = $f; ExpandProperty = 'Principal' }
PS C:\> $a = Get-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment @q
PS C:\> $a | ForEach-Object { $_.Principal.AdditionalProperties.displayName }
Alex Morgan
Sam Patel
Backup Sync Service
That is the active list, and it already includes the application. Eligibility is a separate object in Privileged Identity Management, read with its own cmdlet; MemberType says whether the eligibility was granted to the person directly or arrived through a group:
PS C:\> $e = Get-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleEligibilitySchedule -Filter $f
PS C:\> $e | ForEach-Object {
$o = Get-MgDirectoryObject -DirectoryObjectId $_.PrincipalId
'{0} ({1})' -f $o.AdditionalProperties.displayName, $_.MemberType
}
Jordan Lee (Direct)
Riley Chen (Direct)
Taylor Brooks (Group)
Six principals in two commands. Every later lesson pairs the portal page with the PowerShell that reads the same thing.
What Control of Entra ID Means
Everything that trusts the tenantAn attacker with Global Administrator, or a role that can grant it, controls the tenant's identities.
They can reset an executive's password and authentication methods, add a credential to an application that already holds broad permissions, grant a new application access to every mailbox, change or switch off a Conditional Access policy, add a domain and change how the tenant trusts sign-ins from outside, and create accounts that look like ordinary staff. Through elevation they can assign themselves any role in any Azure subscription.
None of this requires malware or access to any machine. It is all administration, performed through the same admin center and APIs the organization's own administrators use, and it lands in the audit log as routine work. Here are nine minutes of a Global Administrator's activity:
| Date | Service | Category | Activity | Status | Initiated by (actor) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11/12/2026, 2:02 PM | Core Directory | UserManagement | Reset user password | Success | alex.morgan@example.com |
| 11/12/2026, 2:05 PM | Core Directory | Policy | Update conditional access policy | Success | alex.morgan@example.com |
| 11/12/2026, 2:09 PM | Core Directory | ApplicationManagement | Add owner to application | Success | alex.morgan@example.com |
| 11/12/2026, 2:11 PM | Core Directory | ApplicationManagement | Add app role assignment to service principal | Success | alex.morgan@example.com |
A password reset, a policy update, a new owner on an application and a new permission for a service principal.
Every one is something an administrator does in an ordinary week, every one succeeded, and every one is also a step in taking over a tenant: the reset takes an account, the policy change removes a control, the owner can now add credentials to the application, and the app role assignment gives it access it did not have.
The log records what was done and by whom. It does not record whether it should have been. That is the defining difficulty of defending Entra ID: an intrusion is made of legitimate operations, and telling an attacker's change from an administrator's change depends on knowing who should be making which change, from where, and why.
Lesser footholds are still valuable. A single user's session gives the attacker that user's mail, files and chats, which is enough for invoice fraud and for phishing colleagues from a trusted address.
An application with permission to read mail reads every mailbox it covers without any user signing in, and keeps working when every user's password is reset. Each foothold is a step toward the next, which is why the course follows them in order.
The Footholds Attackers Go After
From a session to the whole tenantMicrosoft's own corporate tenant was entered this way. In January 2024 Microsoft reported that Midnight Blizzard, the Russian state actor also tracked as APT29, had sprayed passwords against a legacy, non-production test tenant account that did not have MFA enabled, routing the attempts through residential proxies so that no single address stood out.
From that foothold the actor found a legacy test OAuth application with elevated access to Microsoft's corporate environment, created malicious OAuth applications of its own and a new user account to consent to them, and used the legacy application to grant them the Office 365 Exchange Online full_access_as_app role, which allows access to mailboxes. The applications then read corporate email.
The step that turned that test account into a route to mailboxes was an application holding Graph application permissions. Listing which service principals hold them in a tenant is one query:
PS C:\> $id = '00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000'
PS C:\> $graph = Get-MgServicePrincipal -Filter "appId eq '$id'"
PS C:\> Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignedTo -ServicePrincipalId $graph.Id -All |
Group-Object PrincipalDisplayName |
Select-Object Name, Count | Sort-Object Count -Descending
Every name on that list can read or change data in the tenant without a user present. An application nobody recognizes, or one holding more roles than its purpose needs, is the kind of foothold this section describes, already in place.
What each foothold reaches. Attackers start at the top and work down, and the second row is the one most tenants never review.
Read the chain against the picture. Every step was an identity operation: a sign-in, a consent, a role granted to an application. No server was exploited. The step that mattered most was the second row, an application holding a permission broad enough to grant other applications access to mail, owned by nobody who was watching it.
Microsoft's guidance to defenders afterwards was to review any application holding the Exchange permissions the actor used, audit the privileges of every identity and application with particular attention to unknown, unused and app-only ones, and scope application access to mail so an application reaches only the mailboxes it needs.
Each row of the picture is a module of this course. Sessions are Modules 2 to 5: the password attacks, device code phishing, relayed sign-ins and consent, and stolen tokens that produce them. Applications are Modules 4 and 6. Roles and the bridge into Azure are Module 7, agents are Module 8, and persistence, the hybrid connection to on-premises Active Directory, response and a full intrusion follow.
Asking Copilot Who Controls the Tenant
Delegate, then verifyCopilot chat sits in the side navigation of the Entra admin center, and the first question a defender reasonably asks of a tenant is who controls it. Here is the question, and a prepared example of the kind of answer it produces:
- There are 2 users with the Global Administrator role: Alex Morgan and Sam Patel. (Roles and administrators)
- Global Administrator can manage all aspects of Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft services that use Microsoft Entra identities. (Microsoft documentation)
- Both accounts are assigned the role permanently. (Roles and administrators)
- A Global Administrator can elevate their access to manage all Azure subscriptions. (Microsoft documentation)
The prompt asks for records, not a verdict: every principal, active and eligible, with type and dates, and a page for each line. That is lesson 0.9's rule applied to the question every review starts with. The answer still lists only two people, and both of its people claims cite the same page: a page that shows active assignments by default is the source to open first.
Every sentence reads well, and the answer to the question asked is still wrong. Claims 2 and 4 restate Microsoft's own documentation of the role and of elevation, and claim 3 holds for the two people named. Claim 1 is where the answer fails, and it fails in two ways that the previous sections set up.
It counts users, and the role is not held only by users. The active assignments for Global Administrator include a third principal, Backup Sync Service, a service principal holding the role permanently: anyone with that application's credential is a Global Administrator, and no person signs in when they use it. And it counts only active assignments. The eligible assignments are a separate tab on the same page:
| Name | Principal name | Type | Scope | Membership | Start time | End time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jordan Lee | jordan.lee@example.com | User | Directory | Direct | 8/4/2025, 10:30 AM | Permanent |
| Riley Chen | riley.chen@example.com | User | Directory | Direct | 10/1/2026, 8:00 AM | 12/31/2026, 11:59 PM |
| Taylor Brooks | taylor.brooks@example.com | User | Directory | Group | 9/15/2025, 1:00 PM | Permanent |
Three more people can make themselves Global Administrator whenever they choose, one of them through a group, so that eligibility changes whenever the group's membership does. The honest answer to "who has Global Administrator" is six principals, not two.
Microsoft prints its own caution beside every Copilot answer in Entra, that AI-generated content might be incorrect, and this is the course's first example of why the caution is there. The record you keep says what Copilot got right, the role's description and the elevation it allows, and what it missed: applications, eligibility and groups.
What This Course Does About It
One route at a time, Copilot checked throughoutThe course follows each route into a tenant in turn: how it works, the evidence it leaves in the sign-in and audit logs, and the control that stops it.
Every lesson has Copilot take the first pass at the evidence and has you check it, because that is how this work is now done in the admin center and because, as the last section showed, an assistant's answer is only as complete as the records it read.
Each module also brings in one of Entra ID's own agents where it does the work, and treats its suggestions the same way.
The evidence the course reads comes from the tenant's logs, and in most tenants they are kept for only a short time unless they are sent somewhere. The setting that sends them is one page:
Entra Admin Center
Entra ID › Monitoring & health › Diagnostic settings
Categories
AuditLogs, SignInLogs, NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, ServicePrincipalSignInLogsAdd a diagnostic setting that sends AuditLogs, SignInLogs, NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs and ServicePrincipalSignInLogs to the Log Analytics workspace your analysts query.
With those four categories flowing, every query in the course has the records it needs in a tenant of your own, as well as on the SecOps Range.
By the end you will be able to say, for any tenant, who can act as Global Administrator and how, which applications can read data without a user, which sessions are being used from somewhere they should not be, and which control would have stopped each route, with the record that proves it held.
Practice
Who controls this tenant? prepared evidenceThe scenario below holds Copilot's answer about Global Administrator, the role's active and eligible assignments, and the audit entries for elevation into Azure. Work it as delegate, verify, record: check each of Copilot's claims, find everyone who can act as Global Administrator, and find who still has access to every Azure subscription.
If you have a tenant of your own, open Roles & admins, select Global Administrator and read both the Active and the Eligible assignments tabs, then filter the audit log to the Azure RBAC (Elevated Access) service. Ask Copilot the same question first and compare its answer with what you find.
Entra ID is the identity service in front of everything an organization runs in Microsoft's cloud, so whoever controls it controls all of that through ordinary administration. Control is held through directory roles, actively, by eligibility or by applications, and reaches Azure through elevation.
Attackers work toward it from a single session, through applications with broad permissions, to privileged roles, and every step is an identity operation that the logs record and that a defender who knows what to look for can catch.
Resources
Microsoft revises these pages; where a page and this lesson disagree, the page is newer.
- Microsoft Learn: What is Microsoft Entra ID?
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra built-in roles
- Microsoft Learn: Elevate access to manage all Azure subscriptions and management groups
- Microsoft Security Blog: Midnight Blizzard, guidance for responders on nation-state attack
- Microsoft Learn: Security Copilot in Microsoft Entra
- Microsoft Graph: List unifiedRoleAssignments
- Microsoft Graph: List roleEligibilitySchedules